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Abstract
Anomaly detection-based spoof attack detection is a re-
cent development in face Presentation Attack Detection
(fPAD), where a spoof detector is learned using only non-
attacked images of users. These detectors are of practical
importance as they are shown to generalize well to new
attack types. In this paper, we present a deep-learning
solution for anomaly detection-based spoof attack detec-
tion where both classifier and feature representations are
learned together end-to-end. First, we introduce a pseudo-
negative class during training in the absence of attacked im-
ages. The pseudo-negative class is modeled using a Gaus-
sian distribution whose mean is calculated by a weighted
running mean. Secondly, we use pairwise confusion loss to
further regularize the training process. The proposed ap-
proach benefits from the representation learning power of
the CNNs and learns better features for fPAD task as shown
in our ablation study. We perform extensive experiments
on four publicly available datasets: Replay-Attack, Rose-
Youtu, OULU-NPU and Spoof in Wild to show the effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach over the previous meth-
ods. Code is available at: https://github.com/
yashasvi97/IJCB2020_anomaly
1. Introduction
With the ubiquitous use of mobile phones and laptops,
security of digital devices have attracted considerable inter-
est in the research community. Recent advances in deep
learning and facial recognition has prompted developers to
use face and fingerprint-based authentication mechanisms
in digital systems. Biometric-based authentication meth-
ods are vulnerable to carefully designed spoof attacks. Face
presentation attack is one such spoofing technique against
which many face recognition modules fail considerably1,2
[22]. In a face presentation attack, attacker(s) tries to fool
1www.wired.com/2016/08/hackers-trick-facial-recognition-logins-
photos-facebook-thanks-zuck/
2www.wired.com/story/hackers-say-broke-face-id-security/
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Figure 1. Different formulations in fPAD. In (a) bonafide presen-
tation images and attacked images of known attack types are avail-
able during training. A decision boundary is learned to distinguish
between two types of images. (b) Only bonafide presentation im-
ages are available during training and a decision boundary con-
taining all bonafide presentation data is learned.
the biometric system by presenting a face picture (or a
video) of the enrolled user with the intention of surpass-
ing authentication. To defend against such attacks, the de-
vice needs to learn how to distinguish between attacked im-
ages from the bonafide presentation images. This problem
is commonly referred as the face Presentation Attack De-
tection (fPAD).
Conventionally, fPAD has been formulated as a two class
problem in the literature [16, 3, 20, 38]. Specifically, a bi-
nary classification model is trained using both attacked and
bonafide presentation images (or other biometric cues) as
shown in Figure 1(a). During inference, a query image is
evaluated using the learned classification model. In this
scenario, it is assumed that details of the attacking mecha-
nism is known during training. In practice, attackers can po-
tentially develop more sophisticated attacking mechanisms
unknown to the device. Therefore, it is important that an
fPAD mechanism is robust to attacks that are not seen dur-
ing training. However, a study carried out by Arashaloo et
al. [2] showed that binary classification-based fPAD meth-
ods do not generalize well to new attack types. Arashaloo et
al. [2] further showed that models with better generalization
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can be obtained by training a method only on bonafide pre-
sentation data (as done in anomaly detection) where known
attack images are only used for model evaluation. To this
end, [2] introduced a new branch of research in fPAD called
anomaly detection-based fPAD where spoof detectors are
learned only based on bonafide presentation images of the
enrolled users, as illustrated in Figure 1(b).
Existing methods that address fPAD as an anomaly de-
tection problem utilize off-the-shelf one class classification
algorithms such as one class SVM (OC-SVM) [35], Support
Vector Data Descriptor (SVDD) [37], and one class Gaus-
sian Mixture Models (OC-GMM) [23]. These classifiers
are learned on hand-crafted and/or deep features extracted
from bonafide presentation images [23, 2]. Fatemifar et al.
[13] utilized an ensemble of multiple one class classifiers to
deal with this problem. Recently, Fatemifar et al. [12] pro-
posed to include user id information to improve the fPAD
performance. Note that these approaches either use hand-
crafted features or extract features from a pre-trained deep
network. These features are not learned directly from the
training data. Furthermore, none of these methods provide
a standalone fPAD model that is end-to-end trainable.
In this paper, we propose an fPAD model that can be
trained in an end-to-end fashion. Specifically, we utilize
the representation learning power of a deep Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) to learn better representation from
given bonafide presentation image data and simultaneously
learn classification boundary to enclose the learned repre-
sentations. Since only one class data (bonafide presenta-
tion images of the users) is available during training for
the given problem, CNN training becomes a challenging
task. To overcome this challenge, we propose a novel train-
ing strategy for CNNs by introducing pseudo-negative class
samples in the feature space which help the network learn
a better decision boundary for fPAD. In addition, we use a
Pairwise Confusion (PC) loss [11] to further regularize the
fPAD network during training.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. An end-to-end deep learning solution is presented for
fPAD based on anomaly detection.
2. We propose training deep CNNs with one class data
for fPAD with the help of pseudo-negative sampling in
the feature space.
3. We perform extensive experiments on four pub-
licly available datasets: Replay-Attack, Rose-Youtu,
OULU-NPU and Spoof in Wild and show that the pro-
posed approach is able to perform better compared to
the existing fPAD methods.
2. Related Work
Traditional two class based fPAD. Traditional algorithms
in fPAD require a training dataset with labeled bonafide pre-
sentation and attacked images [20, 5, 3]. Usually a binary
(a) (b) (c)
Pseudo-Negative Data One Class Data
Figure 2. Comparison of one class classification methods. (a) One
Class SVM [35]. (b) OC-CNN [25]. (c) Proposed method.
classifier model is trained on this data and in many cases
with the help of additional biometric cues [3, 20], and fi-
nally the model predicts a test image as bonafide presen-
tation or attacked based on the learned binary classifica-
tion model. For example, Atoum et al. [3] introduced a
novel end-to-end fPAD model which fuses scores from two
deep CNNs – one from depth-based and another from im-
age patch-based. In some of the recent methods, Liu et al. in
[20] trained a binary classifier for fPAD using other modali-
ties, like rPPG signal, depth map, optical flow etc. George et
al. [16] used a multi channel information (like depth, Infra-
Red, etc.) across same feature extraction network and clas-
sify the image as bonafide presentation or attacked based on
the concatenated output feature.
Several other studies use temporal information of videos
to detect whether a video is attacked or not. Liu et al. [18]
use rPPG signal to differentiate between bonafide presen-
tation and 3D mask attacked videos. Liu et al. [19] fur-
ther extended the approach and used Near Infrared (NIR) to
work with remote photoplethysmography correspondence
features for detecting 3D mask attacked videos. Several
works have used texture-based analysis for detecting at-
tacked images. Boulkenafet et al. [5] deploy Local Binary
Patterns (LBP) [1] features calculated for all RGB dimen-
sions and use the concatenated LBP to classify it as bonafide
presentation or attacked image. Boulkenafet et al. improved
this method later [6] using SIFT [21] and SURF [4] features
in both RGB and YCbCr space. In, [14] authors explored
the possibility of using Image Quality Measure (IQM) fea-
tures to perform fPAD.
Anomaly Detection-based fPAD. Arashloo et al. [2] ar-
gued that such two-class approaches can be biased towards
attacked training images and might limit the generalization
ability of the model to novel attacks. Hence, [2] provided
a novel formulation for fPAD based on anomaly detection
where models are learned using only bonafide presentation
images. Following this formulation, Arashloo et al. [2]
proposed a one class SVM [35] based method for fPAD.
Nikisins et al. [23] proposed another approach by model-
ing Image Quality Measure (IQM) features [15] extracted
from the bonafide presentation images with one class GMM
and showed superiority over the one class SVM classifier.
Fatemifar et al. [12] showed that when client ID informa-
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Figure 3. Training algorithm of the proposed method (best viewed in color). A batch of bonafide presentation images (red) is fed into
the face extractor V , which in turn produces a batch of bonafide presentation features (green) of dimension (k × d). A pseudo-negative
feature batch (purple) k × d is sampled from a Gaussian distribution whose mean is calculated considering a running mean of bonafide
presentation features. The concatenated batch of bonafide presentation and pseudo-negative features is fed into the classifier. The output
of the classifier G produces the posterior probability of bonafide presentation and attacked classes.
tion is available, it can be leveraged to further boost the
fPAD performance. Specifically, they train client-specific
PAD models that are based on one class SVM, one class
GMM and Mahalanobis distance. Fatemifar et al. [13] ex-
plored the use of features from specific face regions such as
eyes, mouth, nose etc. which might be helpful in improv-
ing the fPAD performance. Another approach by Fatemifar
et al. [13] utilized ensembles of one class classifiers. All
of these methods use hand-crafted features or features from
a pre-trained deep network and learn an off-the-shelf one
class classifier. None of these methods have utilized deep
networks in the training process to leverage their represen-
tation learning power.
One Class Methods Oza et al. [25] introduce new one class
algorithm where a pseudo negative class centered at origin
is used to train the one class classifier. Authors extended the
same one class approach for active authentication in [26].
Perera et al. [31] also deploy the one class classification
method for active authentication. Authors in [33] learn so-
phisticated deep features focused for one class classifica-
tion. Open set algorithms also aim to detect anomalies or
out of distribution data: Perera et al. [32] introduce mem-
bership loss for novelty classification. Authors in [24, 27]
use data distribution shift and patch level information re-
spectively for multiple class novelty detection. Authors in
[30] learn discriminative deep features for open set recog-
nition. Zhang et al. [39] induce a sparsity constraint on fea-
tures for open set classification. Further, Shao et al. [36]
defend against open set adversarial attacks.
3. Proposed Method
For one class problems, the absence of negative class
data makes it difficult to train a deep network in an end-
to-end fashion. Hence, most work follow a methodology
where deep features are extracted using a pre-trained net-
work and a one class classifier such as one class SVM (OC-
SVM) is trained for classification. To enable end-to-end
learning for deep networks in one class setting, Oza and
Patel [25] proposed a method named one class convolu-
tional neural network (OC-CNN) which attempts to mimic
the idea behind OC-SVM where a separating hyperplane
is learned to separate one class features from the origin.
Specifically, they use samples from a Gaussian distribu-
tion centered at the origin with a small standard deviation
as the pseudo-negative class. Inspired from this work, we
utilize similar framework for training the deep networks.
However, the problem setting considered in [25] considers
anomaly data that are visually distinct as compared to the
training class data we have in fPAD. Hence, the concept
of separating training data in the feature space from a zero
centered Gaussian might work well for their problem set-
ting. Whereas, in the case of fPAD the attacked samples
during testing are very similar to the non-attacked samples
used during training. As a result there exists only a subtle
visual difference between the two classes (bonafide presen-
tation and attacked images of the same person). Hence, im-
ages from both classes can be in a very close proximity to
each other in the feature space. To deal with this issue, we
propose an adaptive mean estimation strategy to generate
pseudo-negative data for training. The goal of this adaptive
strategy is to create the pseudo-negative Gaussian distribu-
tion such that it lies in the close proximity to the features
from the bonafide presentation class data. The differences
among OC-SVM, OC-CNN and the proposed method are
illustrated in Figure 2. In the following sub-sections we dis-
cuss the proposed method in detail. The proposed method
consists of two main parts, a feature extractor network (V )
and a one class classifier (G).
3.1. Feature Extractor
Let {xi}Ni=1 be a set of N training images consisting of
bonafide presentation (i.e. non-attacked) images. These im-
ages are passed through a face recognition network V which
produces a set of d-dimensional features {fi}Ni=1 such that
fi = V (xi) ∈ Rd. These features are then fed into the one
class classifier, G, as described in the following Section.
3.2. One Class Classifier
As discussed earlier, we utilize an adaptive strategy to
estimate the mean of pseudo-negative Gaussian distribution.
The adaptive mean estimation makes sure that samples from
pseudo-negative Gaussian distribution lies in the proximity
of bonafide presentation class features. More formally, we
define a pseudo-negative distribution,N (µ∗, σ) whereN is
a Gaussian distribution whose mean is µ∗ and standard de-
viation is σ. We consider displacement of sample feature
mean of bonafide presentation data across two iterations
when defining µ∗. More precisely, let us consider a batch
(B) that contains features extracted from the non-attacked
images using network V , denoted as fB = {fi},∀i ∈ B.
Let µnew be the mean of feature vectors fB and µold be
the mean of features of the previous batch. Both µnew and
µold are d-dimensional. For training a one class classifier G
a batch B′ of attacked features fB
′
= {fj},∀j ∈ B′ are
sampled from the pseudo-negative class, whose center µ∗ is
calculated as
µ∗ = αµold + (1− α)µnew, (1)
where α is a hyper-parameter controlling the influence of
old mean in the estimation of µ∗ and |B′| = |B| = k. Dur-
ing the first iteration µnew is used to calculate µ∗. The data
f =
(
fB , fB
′
)
is concatenated across the batch dimen-
sion and fed into the classifier G. The corresponding label
vector, is of size 2k × 1, where the first k elements are all
zeros followed by all ones denoting bonafide presentation
and attacked class, respectively. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 3. The classifier G uses these features and produces
probability vector p of size 2k × 1. The network can be
trained using the cross-entropy loss defined as follows
`ce = −
2k∑
i=1
{yi log(pi) + (1− yi) log(1− pi)}, (2)
where, yi denotes the label (0 or 1) of the ith input to the
classifier G and pi denotes the probability of the ith input
being from the pseudo-negative class. Similarly, 1− pi de-
notes the probability of the ith input to the classifierG being
extracted from the non-attacked class data. Our classifier G
consists of 3 fully-connected layers of 8192, 1000, 500 neu-
rons, respectively. The dimension of the input layer is the
same as the output layer of V . The final output has two neu-
rons, one for the probability corresponding to the bonafide
presentation class and other for the attacked class.
As in most cases the network V is pre-trained on a face
recognition dataset and in this case it’s VGGFace [28]. Al-
though pre-trained weights serve as a good initialization for
training the initial layers of V , the high level features (which
will be used as input toG) are not suitable for fPAD. The fi-
nal layer features of a pre-trained network are more suitable
for face recognition. Furthermore, feature representations
are usually clustered by identities. Eliminating the identity
information from the features helps in improving the fPAD
performance as we are only interested in spoof detection
irrespective of the identity information. To this end, we uti-
lize the following Pairwise Confusion (PC) loss [11]
`pc =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
‖fi − fj‖22, (3)
where fi is the feature vector corresponding to image xi.
This loss induces a Euclidean confusion in the pre-trained
feature space and tries to remove the identity information
from it. Disrupting the feature space in this manner results
in better feature representation for fPAD. Note that, this loss
is only calculated using the bonafide presentation features
and not from the pesudo-negative Gaussian samples.
The overall loss function used to train the network is a
linear combintion of both loss functions and is defined as
follows
`final = λ1`pc + λ2`ce, (4)
where λ1 and λ2 are two constants. This loss function is
used to train the spoof detection network in an end-to-end
manner.
4. Datasets and Evaluation Protocols
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model
for fPAD on four datasets: Replay Attack [9], Rose-youtu
[17], OULU-NPU [7] and Spoof in Wild [20]. Sample im-
ages from each dataset are shown in Figure 4.
4.1. Replay Attack
The Replay Attack dataset [9] is an fPAD dataset of 1300
videos consisting of photo and replay attacks. It contains 50
identities and four sets namely, train, development, test and
(a) (b) (c) (d)
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Figure 4. Sample images from each dataset. (a) Replay Attack [9], (b) Rose-Youtu [17] (c) Oulu-NPU [7] and (d)Spoof in Wild [20]. Green
part represents the bonafide presentation samples and red corresponds to the attacked samples of same identity.
enroll. The train, development and test sets contain both
bonafide and attacked presentation data of 15, 15 and 20
identities, respectively. We extract 30-40 frames per video
with a gap of atleast 10 frames in between to carry out our
experiments. HOG-based face detection [10] algorithm is
then used to find the face. We train our model and the base-
lines on only bonafide presentation data from the training
set and test on the bonafide presentation and all attacked
data from the test set.
4.2. Rose-Youtu
The Rose-youtu dataset [17] is an fPAD database which
covers a large variety of illumination conditions and attack
types. There are in total 3350 frontal face videos of 20 sub-
jects captured using 5 mobile phones: Hasee smart-phone,
Huawei smart-phone, iPad 4, iPhone 5s, and ZTE smart-
phone. On average each subject has around 25-50 bonafide
presentation videos. There are three types of attacks in
the dataset: print attack, replay video attack and mask at-
tack. Every 15th frame from the video under consideration
is sampled and then corresponding face is extracted using
the HOG-based face detector [10]. We use 10 train iden-
tities’ bonafide presentation data for training the baselines
and the proposed method. Testing is done on the data from
the remaining 10 identities using all attacks.
4.3. OULU-NPU
The OULU-NPU dataset [7] consists of mobile attacked
videos. There are in total 4950 videos, 55 identities
recorded using six mobile devices in different sessions.
There are mainly two types of attacks in the dataset – print
and replay attack. The print attacks are done using two
types of printers and video replays are done using two dis-
play devices. We consider all attacks in the test set. For
training, only bonafide presentation data corresponding to
the identities in training set are used. For extracting faces
from videos, we sample every 10th frame from each video
and then use the face locations given in the dataset. There
are 20 and 15 different identities in the training set and the
test set, respectively.
4.4. Spoof in Wild
The Spoof in Wild dataset [20] is a collection of 4478
videos distributed among 165 identities. All videos are cap-
tured in minimum 1080p resolution. Each subject has 8
bonafide presentation and around 20 attacked videos. There
are two types of attacks in the dataset – print attack based
on glossy and matt paper, and replay attack created using
4 different devices. All attacks are considered during test-
ing. Faces are extracted from each video by sampling at
every 10th frame. We use the face locations provided in the
dataset to extract faces. This data is then used to carry out
experiments. We use only bonafide presentation data from
the training set for training the baselines and the proposed
model. Data from 90 subjects are used during training and
the remaining data from 75 different users are used during
teting.
We evaluate the performance of anomaly detection-
based fPAD methods on two protocols. The details of these
protocols are described as follows:
• Protocol 1: In this protocol models are trained using the
identities in the training set with only bonafide presenta-
tion image data and evaluated on the identities of the test
set having both bonafide presentation and attacked images.
Both sets contain non-overlapping identities.
• Protocol 2: For this protocol, enrollment split is used
for model training and evaluation [12]. fPAD models are
trained using a training set and evaluated on the test set.
Both training and test set are derived from the enrollment
split of the datasets and both have bonafide presentation
and attacked images of same identities. Unlike [13], we
do not utilize any identity label information and hence for
fair comparison consider only class-independent models of
[13].
5. Implementation Details
In all datasets we only use the bonafide presentation data
from the training set without using any identity label infor-
mation for training the model. The test data consists of both
bonafide and attack presentation data. For datasets without
face locations, we use HOG-based face detection mecha-
nism [10]. The values for λ1 and λ2 are set equal to 3 and
1, respectively. The value of α is set equal to 0.8. The
standard deviation of the pseudo-negative Gaussian is set
as 1. VGGFace [28] is used as the base feature extraction
module. The layer just after the convolution layers, that is
‘fc6’(4096 dimension) of VGGFace is used to extract fea-
tures. Thus output of the ‘fc6’ layer is used as the input to
the classifier G. The last two convolution layers, ‘fc6’ of
V along with all the parameters of G are trained using the
loss equation (4). The model is trained for 100 epochs with
1e-4 learning rate, batch size of 80 and results are reported
in Section 6.
6. Results and Analysis
In this section, we discuss results on the aforementioned
datasets and present an in depth analysis of the proposed
method. We use Average Classification Error Rate (ACER)
as the metric to compare the performance of different meth-
ods. ACER is the average of the Attack Presentation Clas-
sification Error Rate (APCER) and Bonafide Presentation
Classification Error Rate (BPCER) at a particular threshold
[34]. Since APCER and BPCER are threshold-based val-
ues, ACER is also dependent on a threshold τ and is defined
as follows
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
%.
In our comparisons we aim to find the threshold for which
the average of APCER and BPCER is least. ACER is cal-
culated for each identity in the test set and the average of
ACER is reported in Table 1.
6.1. Comparison with Baseline One Class classifiers
For our baseline comparisons we consider the following
five methods:
1. OC-SVM - One class SVM (OC-SVM) [35] maps the
one class data into a feature space and tries to learn a
hyperplane between the training data and origin. Im-
plementation from sklearn library [29] is used with de-
fault parameters and ν=0.1. Signed distance from the
hyperplane is used as an anomaly score.
2. SVDD - Support Vector Data Description (SVDD)
[37] is an extension to the one class SVM where it
tries to learn a hypershpere around the training data
as opposed to a hyperplane separating the origin. Op-
timization is done to have minimum spherical radius
that can contain all data. Default implementation of
LibSVM library [8] is used with parameter ν=0.1. Dis-
tance from the center is used as the anomaly score.
3. MD - Mahalanobis Distance (MD) assumes data is
coming from a Gaussian distribution with single mode
and computes the distance based on the parameters of
the Gaussian model. The bonafide presentation data
is used to estimate the parameters of Gaussian model.
The distance calculated based on the estimated mean
and variance of Gaussian model is used as the anomaly
score. Higher distance increases the likelihood of a test
image being an attacked image. MD is implemented
using the Sklearn library.
4. OC-GMM - A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is
learned using bonafide presentation class data. Param-
eters of the GMM are estimated using the Sklearn li-
brary. For consistency across all datasets, the number
of components are set equal to 50. Log likelihood of a
test sample belonging to GMM is used as the anomaly
score for calculating ACER.
5. OC-CNN - One Class CNN [25] trains a classifier us-
ing one class data and pseudo-negative Gaussian dis-
tribution centered at the origin. The probability that
a test sample is a bonafide presentation is used as the
anomaly score.
For the proposed algorithm, we use the probability for class
0, i.e., being a bonafide presentation as the anomaly score
to calculate ACER.
6.2. Experiments using Protocol 1
As can be seen from Table 1 the proposed algorithm (last
column) outperforms all the other methods. Among the
baseline methods, one class GMM performs the best as it
helps capturing the multi-modal nature of the distribution of
Dataset OC-SVM SVDD MD OC-GMM OC-CNN Proposed(APCER, BPCER)
Replay Attack [9] 31.142 32.961 31.747 30.096 35.985
20.739
(25.047, 16.539)
Rose Youtu [17] 47.165 46.532 38.993 46.771 35.808
31.623
(35.573, 27.673)
Oulu NPU [7] 47.561 47.517 45.185 46.957 45.799
30.242
(38.632, 21.852)
Spoof In Wild [20] 47.165 47.051 42.970 44.250 36.994
23.335
(23.482, 23.187)
Table 1. Comparison of the proposed algorithm with baseline one class classifiers for Protocol 1. The values in bold represent the lowest
ACER(%) with APCER(%) and BPCER(%) in brackets.
bonafide presentation features. However, the proposed ap-
proach outperforms one class GMM significantly, providing
overall improvement of ∼6% across all datasets. This per-
formance improvement can be attributed to the novel train-
ing strategy of separating the bonafide presentation features
from Gaussian sampled features, which are in close prox-
imity and helps in learning a good decision boundary. Fur-
thermore, training a deep neural network using the given
data for spoof detection helps in learning more rich features
rather than using hand-crafted or pre-trained features.
6.3. Experiments using Protocol 2
The results of experiments on protocol 2 are summa-
rized in Fig. 5. Specifically, for the Replay Attack dataset
[9] the best identity independent one class classifier is one
class GMM, which achieves ACER of 9.96% [13]. Whereas
the proposed method achieves ACER of 7.334 % providing
∼2% improvement. For the Rose-Youtu dataset, one class
GMM achieves ACER of 17.54% [13], whereas the pro-
posed algorithm achieves ACER of 10.354%, resulting in
an improvement of ∼7%. Additionally, we performed pro-
tocol 2 experiments on OULU-NPU and Spoof in Wild and
the best performing classifier OC-GMM achieved ACER
of 13.927% and 23.383%, respectively. In comparison,
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Figure 5. Comparison of the best baseline (OC-GMM) and the
proposed method for Protocol 2 in terms of ACER.
the proposed approach achieved ACER of 12.473% and
21.557% for OULU-NPU and Spoof in Wild, providing
∼1% and ∼2% improvements respectively.
The results in Table 1 and Figure 5 show that the pro-
posed approach outperforms other one class classifiers in
both Protocol 1 and Protocol 2.
6.4. Comparison with OC-CNN
The method proposed in [25], introduced a pseudo-
negative class to train the one class classifier. The method
works well for their problem setup of anomaly detection,
where training and test data have categorical and visual dif-
ferences. But considering the fPAD-based anomaly detet-
ing problem formulation, the face images at training and
test time have very subtle visual differences. In some cases,
these images may belong to the same identity and therefore
it will not be optimal to separate bonafide presentation fea-
tures fromN (0, 1) noise. From the results in Table 1, when
the model is trained with a Gaussian centered at 0, ACER
value is 35.985% for the Replay Attack Dataset. Instead
when trained with a Gaussian whose center is chosen by the
running mean, i.e., the proposed method, we see a signifi-
cant improvement performance, achieving ACER of 20.739
%. Therefore, modeling the attacked class in the proxim-
ity to the bonafide presentation features helps in building a
more sophisticated one class classifier for fPAD.
6.5. Ablation study
Effect of Pairwise Confusion loss: In this experiment
we study the effect of pair-wise confusion loss [11] on the
performance of the proposed model. We show that when the
model is trained without the pair-wise loss, the performance
is lower as compared to when PC loss is used. Here, we
consider Replay-Attack dataset for the experiments. When
the proposed model is trained with the PC loss, the perfor-
mance is 20.739% ACER. The t-SNE feature visualization
for this experiment is also provided in Fig. 6(b). On the
other hand, when we train the proposed method without the
pair-wise confusion loss, the ACER increases to 32.860%.
(a) After Training-
without PC loss
(b) After Training -
with PC loss
Real Attacked
Figure 6. t-SNE plots for data corresponding to identities 1, 2, and
4 of the Replay-Attack dataset combined. The points in green rep-
resent the bonafide presentation features, and their attacked ver-
sions are marked in red. Figure (a) shows the t-SNE plot of the
feature space when extracted using a trained network without the
PC Loss. It can be seen that all the bonafide presentation features
are cluttered in the feature space and are closer to their attacked
counterparts. Figure (b) on the other hand shows the same feature
space, but now the bonafide presentation features are all packed
into a single cluster which are more suited for one class seting.
The corresponding t-SNE feature visualization for this ex-
periment is given in Fig. 6(a). When we compare the t-SNE
visualization of the features provided in Fig. 6, we can see
that the best the model trained with pair-wise confusion loss
achieves the feature embedding most suited for the anomaly
detection-based fPAD model and thereby resulting in the
improved performance among all other baselines.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we tackled the problem of face presenta-
tion attack detection based on anomaly detection. We point
out the shortcomings of the existing work that address this
issue and propose a novel method to alleviate these short-
comings. More precisely, we proposed a new end-to-end
trainable, face presentation attack detection model based on
deep convolutional neural network that can be trained with
data from only one class. The proposed method utilizes a
novel training procedure for one class neural network with
the help of pseudo-negative sampling in the feature space.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach to
include deep networks in the learning process and lever-
age their power of representation learning in an end-to-end
manner for anomaly-based face presentation attack detec-
tion task. Extensive experiments on four publicly available
datasets show that the proposed approach outperforms all
existing approaches for the task. Furthermore, an ablation
study was provided to show the significance of individual
components of the proposed method.
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